If Israel and its supporters want the country to continue receiving U.S. largesse, they will need to come up with a new narrative.
By Steven A. Cook, a columnist at Foreign Policy and the Eni Enrico Mattei senior fellow for Middle East and Africa studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.
MARCH 13, 2023, 10:50 AM
In early March, U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Mark Milley visited Israel. According to press reports, Iran was at the top of the agenda. After Milley departed the Holy Land, U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin began a Middle East trip that will include stops in Egypt, Israel, and Jordan. These meetings among Israeli and U.S. security officials come not long after a large U.S.-Israel military exercise, the CIA director’s visit to meet with senior Israeli and Palestinian leaders, and four tours of Israel by U.S. Central Command’s senior officer in 2022.
All this traffic reflects what has long been a core interest of the United States: ensuring Israeli security. It is a goal that U.S. policymakers, Israel’s supporters, and Israelis justify on moral grounds: Israel is uniquely vulnerable in a hostile neighborhood, it shares the United States’ values, and it is an ally.
It is a narrative that has kept the aid flowing over the years—but is it true? Perhaps once it was, but the idea that Israel needs U.S. aid to secure its existence and that the two countries share a common set of democratic principles no longer makes sense.
In U.S. political discourse, it is axiomatic that Israel is in a constant struggle for survival. But this narrative is an anachronism. Israel is in a better strategic position than ever, and its sovereignty is beyond question. Let’s take a tour around the region: Israel has peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan. It has normal relations with Bahrain, Morocco, Sudan, and the United Arab Emirates. The Israelis also have informal ties with Saudi Arabia. Qatar allows Israeli diamond traders to do business in Doha, and Oman has recently agreed to open its airspace to Israel’s airliners.
Along with its Arab partners, the United States, and Europe, Israel has managed to marginalize the Palestinian question. Turkey and Israel reconciled after years of estrangement. And in one of the most unexpected developments in the Middle East in 2022, Lebanon and Israel established a maritime border and are partners of sorts in the exploitation of natural gas reserves off their shared coastline. Of Israel’s remaining Arab adversaries, Syria is devastated by a decade of civil war, Iraq remains unstable and inwardly focused, and others remain too far away and are incapable of threatening Israeli security.
Of course, Iran remains a significant challenge for Israel. The threat is real, and the Israelis have proven themselves adept at meeting it. In recent years, they have been striking the Iranians at will whether in Syria, Iraq, or Iran itself. Analysts refer to this as a “shadow war” or the “war between the war,” but it does not seem like a fair fight.
The Iranians have had a few successes targeting Israel-owned shipping in the Arabian Sea, but they have hardly been able to match the Israeli military’s proficiency and effectiveness. If recent reports that the Iranians will acquire Russia’s Su-35s fighter planes are true, then it is clear that Tehran is trying to level the playing field. Without a doubt, it is a worrying development for Israel, but after Moscow’s debacle in Ukraine, Russian equipment and doctrine hardly seem as fearsome as once assumed.
Iran’s apparent drive for nuclear weapons capability is a far more dangerous proposition for Israel than the Islamic Republic’s conventional forces. Israeli defense officials worry that if the Iranians get the bomb it would reduce the Israel Defense Forces’ freedom of action, placing Israel’s security in jeopardy. It is a strategic problem, to say the least. The Israelis would like to destroy the Iranian nuclear program, but they seem incapable.
Unless the United States uses its own forces against Iran’s nuclear program, Israel will likely have to come to grips with establishing and maintaining a deterrent with a nuclear-capable Iran. The Israeli government has never publicly acknowledged its own nuclear arsenal, but it is believed to have 90 weapons and enough plutonium stockpiled for 100 to 200 more. It is a minimal deterrent, but if the Iranians become a nuclear power as expected, the Israelis will likely add to their arsenal of weapons and delivery systems. This is hardly optimal for the Israelis and a reason for gloom, but it does not portend their doom.
So, yes, Israel confronts external security challenges, but on balance the country has never been more secure. It has a large, sophisticated, and potent military along with a high-tech defense industrial base to support it. By any measure, it is a wealthy (Israel’s GDP per capita was about $52,000 in 2021), capable, and secure country. Washington may want to maintain its defense and security ties with Jerusalem, but the reason cannot be because Israel is vulnerable within a region that is implacably hostile. That is simply at odds with objective reality.
When it comes to values, U.S. policymakers and elected leaders often refer to Israel as “the only democracy in the Middle East.” It is more democratic than its neighbors, but throughout its history, Israel has struggled to reconcile democracy with its ethno-religious, nationalist roots. It was extraordinary when the Islamist United Arab List, or Ra’am, party became a member of the governing coalition in 2021; but that government, which lasted a year, may have been the exception to prove the (informal) rule that Arabs can sit in the Knesset but must not have power.
Formally, Jewish and non-Jewish citizens of the state enjoy the same rights. Yet, in practice, Israeli society diverges from this ideal. Although there have been improvements in life expectancy, birth rates, and employment, Israel’s so-called Arab sector is disadvantaged along a range of socioeconomic indicators. Overall, Palestinian citizens of Israel are poorer, less educated, and have fewer opportunities than Jewish Israelis.
It’s not just the discrimination of Palestinian citizens of Israel (also sometimes referred to as Israeli Arabs) that raises questions about the quality of Israeli democracy. In recent years, Israeli lawmakers have passed legislation that cracks down on non-governmental organizations that receive foreign funding, bullied human rights groups, and passed a “nation-state law” that essentially formalizes the first- and second-class citizenship of Jews and Arabs, respectively, in Israeli society. These issues have largely been ignored in the United States. At best, they are buried in State Department reports that few ever read. Israel has always been democratic enough for U.S. presidents and members of Congress.
The current Israeli government is making Israel’s democratic deficits hard to ignore, however. These issues have been covered extensively so there is no need to delve into details here. In brief, the Israeli government seeks to weaken checks and balances in Israel’s political system, redefine Israeli identity along religious lines that a majority of Israelis do not share, undermine the security of LGBTQ citizens, and annex parts of the West Bank. Avowedly fascist and racist government ministers who make no apologies for their worldviews are driving this agenda. Their only interests are the land and the Lord.
It is not appropriate for the United States to tell Israelis how to live or organize their society, but let’s no longer pretend that the two countries share democratic values. Perhaps the ongoing mass protests against the government will prove that Israel’s democratic practices are stronger than its demagogues. That would be a good thing for Israelis and strengthen the argument about values, but Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his partners do not seem to be backing down. Former U.S. President Ronald Reagan once said, “There is no nation like us, except Israel.” It was a nice sentiment, but it is not true, especially now.
In recent years, Israel has become more secure and less democratic. If Israel and its supporters want the country to continue receiving U.S. largesse, they will need to come up with a new narrative.